

# ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF A RESERVE FOR THE REGULAR ARMY

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PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS  
AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY  
POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

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ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF A  
RESERVE FOR THE REGULAR ARMY.

[A brochure based upon and explanatory of a Statement of a Proper Military Policy for  
the United States, Sept. 11, 1915.]

1. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BROCHURE.

A Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, submitted September 11, 1915, contains in Chapter III, Reserves, the following paragraph:

41. *The regular reserve.*—As the United States should have a mobile force of 500,000 soldiers available at home at the outbreak of war, the Army, with the regular reserve, should amount to this strength. In order to develop the necessary regular reserve with the Army at the strength advocated in this policy, enlistments would have to be for about eight years—two with the colors and six in reserve. That would, in eight years, result in approximately the following mobile forces at home available at the outbreak of war:

(1) Mobile regular troops (combatant) with the colors-----	121, 000
(2) The regular reserve-----	379, 000
Total -----	500, 000

During the first weeks of war in this country the military situation will probably be critical. At that time every fully trained soldier should be put in the field. To do that with the small military establishment herein advocated it is necessary that during peace the Army be kept at war strength and that the regular reserve be organized and not kept back to replace losses expected during war. Such losses should be replaced from depot units.

2. CHARACTER OF RESERVE DISCUSSED.

Generally speaking, any troops not incorporated in the Regular Army, but intended for reenforcement thereof, constitute a reserve of such Army. This paper deals only with that portion of such a reserve force as is developed through the ranks of the Regular Army and is intended for use jointly with the Regular Army; that which consists of trained and organized mobile troops, ready for use at the outbreak of war under conditions stated in paragraph 6 of the "Statement of a proper military policy."

The estimate of 379,000 men in reserve, stated in the policy, (W. C. D., 9053-90) is based on the experience that while serving with the colors, about 20 per cent per year of our soldiers are lost otherwise than by expiration of enlistment (W. C. D. 9053-43), and on the assumption that such loss while men are furloughed to the

reserve will be at about half this rate and that about 28 per cent of the Army will be enlisted men with special qualifications needed continuously with the colors. The strength being 231,166 (omitting Philippine Scouts and Porto Rican Regiment), 72 per cent thereof, or 166,500, will develop approximately 379,000 reserves at the end of eight years.

### 3. THE PRESENT "ARMY RESERVE."

It is well, in consideration of this subject, to study the existing law and ascertain whether it will furnish the number of reservists required.

Section 2 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat., 590, 591; pp. 36 and 37, Bulletin No. 15, War Department, 1912), provided for the Army reserve consisting of:

(1) *Class A*.—Soldiers furloughed and transferred at the expiration of three years' service and soldiers furloughed at the expiration of four years' service, unless they apply to remain with their organizations until completion of the seven-years' period of enlistment, made effective on November 1, 1912, by the act.

(2) *Class B*.—Soldiers who reenlist in the Army reserve for a term of three years at the expiration of a seven-years' period of enlistment, and persons honorably discharged from the Regular Army who may enlist in the Army reserve for a term of three years. No restriction is placed upon reenlistment of any soldier.

The same act provided an "auxiliary to the Army reserve" consisting of honorably discharged soldiers of the Regular Army not over 45 years of age with character reported at least good, who, when called by proclamation of the President in time of war or when war is imminent, present themselves for reenlistment within a specified period and are found physically qualified for the duties of a soldier.

### 4. REGULATIONS FOR "ARMY RESERVE."

Members of the Army reserve not in active service are not entitled to pay or allowances. If summoned by the President to active service when so authorized by Congress, in event of threatened or actual hostilities, reservists of class A receive during continuance of their service pay and allowances authorized by law for soldiers serving in their organizations and a sum equal to \$5 per month for each month they have belonged to the reserve, as well as actual cost of transportation and subsistence from their homes to the places at which they may be ordered to report for duty. They revert to the grade of private on date of reporting for duty. Reservists of class B receive the same, including additional pay for second enlistment.

Each honorably discharged soldier summoned by the President as part of the "auxiliary to the Army reserve" found physically



qualified and reenlisted in the line of the Army or Hospital Corps receives on reenlisting a *bounty* computed at rates from \$8 to \$2 per month, according to the period which has elapsed since his last discharge, and not to exceed \$300 for any member of such auxiliary.

Doubtless, because of language employed in the last proviso of section 2, viz, "may summon all furloughed soldiers who belong to the Army reserve to rejoin their respective organizations," and because of the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, October 1, 1912 (pp. 34-39, Bulletin No. 22, War Department, 1912), the Regulations for the Army Reserve, General Orders No. 11, War Department, 1913, as amended, prescribe that the records of class A reservists and of such class B reservists as have been assigned to organizations be kept by the commanders of organizations or chiefs of bureaus, the numbers thereof being noted on monthly returns and the names on December muster rolls, or reported monthly by number, and December 31 by name in letters to The Adjutant General.

The custodians of such records furnish each reservist whose record is held a postal card once each quarter, on which the reservist reports any change of address or change in name and address of nearest relative. This represents the only measure by which the number of reservists still alive may be estimated. No measure provides verification of physical condition of reservists.

## 5. DEFECTS OF PRESENT LAW.

This law is defective in the following respects:

(a) It will not develop an adequate reserve. On May 8, 1915, The Adjutant General submitted an estimate of the approximate number of men who under this law will be furloughed or transferred to the Army Reserve. Basing his estimate upon the percentage of men enlisted or reenlisted who did not from 1908 to 1914 reenlist after completing their periods of enlistment, he reported that by November 1, 1919, seven years after the seven-years' period became effective, the Army Reserve may amount to 25,624 enlisted men, the number thereafter furloughed to the reserve being approximately equal to those discharged from the reserve. He reported that if all men who did not intend to reenlist be furloughed to the reserve at the expiration of three years' service the reserve by November 1, 1919, may amount to 34,000 men. Even if no casualties occur among members of the reserve, its strength will never be sufficient to raise units from peace to war strength if such step be desirable. The Regular Army, including reserve, will never exceed 134,000 men under this law.

(b) No reliable estimate can be made of the number of reservists to be anticipated.

The estimate given in (a) is confessedly only a guess. As reenlistment is not limited, and men have the option of serving three, four, or seven years of the period for which enlisted, the reserve developed, as well as the actual strength of the Army, depends upon the business conditions of the country. If labor commands a high price, men who do not desert will seek purchase of discharge after one year's service or furlough to the reserve after three years' service. If times are hard and their station agreeable, they may decide to remain seven years and then reenlist, or may reenlist at expiration of four years rather than pass to the reserve. Their decision may be influenced by conditions prevailing at their stations or their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their commanders or associates.

(c) The law by providing that reservists shall, when summoned, "*rejoin* their respective organizations" countenances the expensive and inefficient system of reduced strength of units in peace.

In a country of as great area as the United States reservists could not always or usually join "their respective organizations" in time to participate in employment of such organizations when war comes without warning. Even if, after long and expensive journeys, these reservists join the companies from which furloughed, they would not find arms and equipment on hand for issue. If such are kept always with companies, much expense for transportation will result. Officers for a company of Infantry of 150 men cost no more than for a company of 65 men. The same officers can command and administer 150 men in war efficiently only if required to command and administer approximately the same sized organization in peace.

(d) Mobilization must be delayed, even when hostilities are actual, until authority can be obtained from Congress.

If Congress be not in session, or if, being in session, the question be debated, the transportation, equipment, and training of the Army Reserve may be delayed until a hostile force has effected a landing or crossed our international border.

(e) Absence of any authority to mobilize, inspect, or train reservists, except "in event of actual or threatened hostilities" and "when so authorized by Congress," renders uncertain how many reservists may be relied upon and "found physically fit for service."

Freed from the restraints of discipline and separated from the sanitary conditions surrounding them when with the colors, furloughed soldiers may contract vicious habits or incurable diseases, may lose eyesight, hearing, or a limb, and yet be borne on the rolls of "their respective organizations" as potential soldiers when summoned.

(f) Payment of bounties to members of the "auxiliary to the Army reserve" and of sums not thus called, but equivalent to bounties to members of the Army reserve, gives legislative sanction



to a pernicious system of purchasing compliance with his duty by a citizen in the first case and with the obligation voluntarily assumed by a soldier in the second.

Any ex-soldier whose services are desirable in war will appear somewhere, either as an officer or enlisted man of volunteers, or as an enlisted regular, whether or not it be possible for him to collect a bounty "not to exceed \$300." A soldier who has been away from the colors six years and six months will receive the total of \$300, as will another who, having been discharged at 21 (after three years' enlistment under former laws), offers to enlist 23 years later, or before he is 45. Is either worth more than a young, healthful college graduate with four years' attendance at such an institution as Cornell and two or three summers at a students' camp? No "bounty" is payable to the latter.

A member of the Army reserve, sworn to serve seven years, but furloughed during the latter four, may be paid at the rate of \$5 per month for the entire period spent in the Army reserve. No limit of \$300 is prescribed in determining the total of such sums payable. If a soldier has served as a reservist more than five years in various enlistments, he receives more than \$300 (pp. 4 and 5, Bulletins 33, War Department, 1913). Why should a soldier be paid for complying with his oath of enlistment?

Reports of The Adjutant General show that about 61,033 ex-soldiers who left the service from June 30, 1910, to June 30, 1914, are now in civil life. Should the President call upon them to present themselves for reenlistment under this Act about June 30, 1916, the possible bounties payable, ranging from \$192 to \$300 (2 years to 6 years, 6 months out of service), amount to \$15,000,000. Other ex-soldiers, discharged fiscal years 1891-1909, inclusive, amount to 83,000, and their bounties to \$25,000,000, a total of \$40,000,000 for the "auxiliary to the Army reserve." At the average rate of annual pay of infantry soldiers in a peace strength company (\$213 about) this sum, offered to purchase enlistment of 83,000 men, would furnish more than the pay of 10 divisions for one year. If the possible Army reserve after 1919 be estimated at 34,000 men, and the average period of each of these in the reserve be considered two years (half the possible period in reserve during one enlistment), return of these to the colors would cost over \$4,000,000—a little more than the pay of one division for a year.

## 6. NECESSITY FOR CHANGE IN LAW.

As this legislation represents our first effort to provide by law for a reserve of the Regular Army, it is not surprising that the result is disappointing.

It was stated in the Report of the Organization of the Land Forces, 1912 (p. 31) :

In adopting a new policy in our Army it is important that present conditions should not be disturbed more violently than necessary.

\* \* \* The important thing is to take a step toward the new policy, leaving its perfection to the experience of the future.

After the experience of the past three years it is necessary that we so change the legislation governing a reserve that such force may be developed regardless of business conditions, developed to an extent sufficient for adequate defense and capable of immediate mobilization in organized units composed of men physically fit and properly armed and equipped without the necessity and expense of purchasing compliance with military obligations by payment of bounties.

#### 7. DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVE.

If the country can afford the expense, the 500,000 men found necessary for immediate use against trained troops of a possible invader should all be continuously with the colors, and continued reenlistment of every desirable soldier should be encouraged. The professional soldier should be encouraged to remain permanently in the ranks, and the only reserve required can be gradually absorbed from depot units as casualties occur in war.

The expense for the Army under this plan would be prohibitive; but, if we do not have reserves, we are committed to a policy of maximum cost.

If the country can not afford to adopt a system involving maximum cost, it is equally necessary to have ready for immediate mobilization a force equal in size and as nearly as possible equal in training.

The military problem is not affected by the financial ability of this country to meet the bill. If the 500,000 men required are not maintained always with the colors they should at least have served with the colors in the ranks of the Regular Army a period sufficient to receive training that will render each member continuously efficient during his period in the reserve. This period is fixed at two years in the Statement of a Proper Military Policy. The period each such trained soldier must remain in the reserve depends upon the relation of the strength with the colors to the total force required and the percentage of each unit which, because permitted to reenlist, does not contribute toward development of a reserve. In this policy such period is six years, based upon figures shown in paragraph 2 above.

The economic effect of a reserve system is to reduce the per capita cost of an army of the size demanded by the military situation. Economy suggests designation of a large fraction of the 500,000 required as reserves. Effective action in emergency limits such

expansion of the reserve portion to that fraction which can retain efficiency and jointly with the peace nucleus satisfy the demands of the military problem.

The provision of a reserve is a purely business proposition.

#### **8. COMPOSITION OF EACH UNIT, REGULAR ARMY.**

The enlisted strength of every unit of the Army should consist of two portions:

(a) A permanent personnel composed of those men essential to the continued discharge by such unit of its function as a training school for reservists.

(b) A temporary personnel composed of those citizens who are passed through this training school and prepared for possible service as members of other (reserve) units of the same or of a similar arm of the service.

#### **9. PERIOD WITH THE COLORS SHOULD BE DEFINITE.**

While deserving soldiers, who apply and are recommended by their commanders as sufficiently trained, should be granted furloughs to the reserve after a period of less than two years, provided the military situation warrants the grant of such privilege, it must not be optional, as now, for a soldier to remain with the colors longer than two years, unless he be a noncommissioned officer or a man of other technical training essential as a member of the permanent personnel of his organization for the training of other soldiers or the administration of the organization. To permit soldiers generally an option as to length of service with the colors, is to continue the present uncertainty as to the size of reserve that may be developed. The privilege of discharge by purchase should be repealed. Not to exceed 28 per cent of each unit should be permitted to reenlist.

No soldier, whether with the colors or with the reserve, should be discharged except for expiration of period of enlistment, by sentence of court-martial, or for physical disability or other unfitness for military service.

#### **10. DEGREE OF READINESS OF REGULAR RESERVE.**

Reserve units supplied with trained personnel should not be confused with the force of citizen soldiers discussed in the first section of paragraph 42 of the Statement of a Proper Military Policy. The latter force will probably not have received, in time of peace, sufficient training to render it fit for immediate employment against the enemy at the outbreak of war, but the reserve of the Regular Army must be ready for such employment, and hence its members must



have had such training as will fit it for immediate service jointly with that portion of the Regular Army serving with the colors. For the same reason it must have in peace such organization and equipment as will render possible its instantaneous mobilization and transportation to the places at which its action is desirable when war becomes imminent.

### 11. ORGANIZATION OF UNITS.

Section 4 of the act of Congress approved April 25, 1914, contains this proviso:

*Provided further*, That when military conditions so require, the President may organize the land forces of the United States into brigades and divisions and such higher units as he may deem necessary, and the composition of units higher than the regiment shall be as he may prescribe.

The reserve of the Army being a part of the Regular Army, and therefore of the "land forces of the United States," according to the act cited above, this proviso authorizes the organization of reserve units higher than the regiment by Executive orders of the President. Organization of other units—regiments and lesser—has been provided by various acts of Congress. Because of development of armament and function of certain branches of the service, this legislation requires changes. The organization of various units of the Regular Army reserve should be the same as the organization of similar units of the Regular Army.

### 12. MOBILE TROOPS ALONE REQUIRED.

The military problem requiring a force of 500,000 men available at home as a mobile force, that portion designated as a regular reserve, must be composed of mobile troops.

As stated in paragraph 32 of a Statement of a Proper Military Policy, all mine fields and over-sea guns and one-half the guns at home are manned from the Regular Army. The remainder of the guns at home are to be manned by Coast Artillery units of the Organized Militia.

This arrangement suggests the propriety of assigning enlisted men of the reserve who have received training as members of the Coast Artillery Corps units of the Regular Army to reserve units of Field Artillery. This is especially desirable, as the quota of reservists developed by units of Field Artillery recommended will not be sufficient to furnish personnel for the corps or field army artillery required as a portion of the mobile artillery of the reserve.

### 13. DISTRIBUTION IN ARMS OF THE SERVICE.

Based upon the enlisted strength of various units of the Regular Army shown in Tables of Organization, 1914, the 379,000 enlisted members of the reserve would furnish mobile reserve units approximately as follows:

No.	Units.	Enlisted strength.			
		Combatant.	Sanitary.	Quarter-master Corps.	Total.
15	Divisions, Infantry.....	310,095	12,390	6,315	328,800
3	Divisions, Cavalry.....	26,931	1,344	810	29,085
9	Regiments, Heavy Field Artillery.....	10,980			10,980
3	Regiments, Mountain Field Artillery.....	3,297			3,297
10	Ponton battalions, Engineers.....	4,940			4,940
6	Field battalions, Signal Corps.....	815			815
15	Aero squadrons, Signal Corps.....	1,350			1,350
5	Corps, or field armies.....	358,408	13,734	7,125	379,267

No sanitary nor supply units for corps or field army troops nor line of communications troops need be organized in this reserve. Sufficient sanitary and supply units as composite parts of divisions are shown above for units which may anticipate contact with the enemy. Such troops for corps or field army troops and all troops for the line of communications may be supplied by citizen soldiers not necessarily possessing so great a degree of training.

### 14. ESTIMATE OF STRENGTH AFTER THREE YEARS.

Upon the adoption of a policy such as is recommended, the members of the present Army reserve and such men as have enlisted under the present law will, as furloughs become due, constitute the only reservists until two years from the date the new law becomes effective. As seen in the discussion of the act of August 24, 1912, the size of the reserve during such period will not until November 1, 1919, exceed 34,000, if men generally are furloughed at expiration of three years' service, or 25,000 if furloughed generally at the expiration of four years' service.

If legislation pursuant to this policy be adopted so as to give effect thereto July 1, 1916, the Army reserve should by July 1, 1918, equal about 20,000 men. By July 1, 1919, the increment received by the reserve under the new law should be 112,000 (86 per cent of 131,000, the added strength of the Regular Army), which, with what then remains of the "Army reserve," should furnish a reserve of about 135,000 men.

## 15. ORGANIZATION UNDER DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.

Until such time members of the reserve, being dispersed by residence throughout the country and being comparatively small in number, could not well be organized into units larger than companies, troops, batteries, etc. Records of reservists should be kept at each department headquarters until administrative units (regiments, separate battalions, etc.) can be organized. A soldier furloughed to the reserve should, on designation of the place of his intended residence, be directed to report (on blank form prepared for him by his organization commander) to the department commander or administrative unit commander of his branch of the service for the area including his selected place of residence. Regulations governing his duties and rights should be given him for his guidance. Subsequent instructions should be sent to him, at the address reported by him, from department headquarters or from the headquarters of the administrative unit to which he may be assigned. An officer of the General Staff, under direction of the department commander, should have charge of assignment of all furloughed soldiers coming within the department until administrative units shall have been organized. Thereafter the same officer should care for correspondence concerning assignment of personnel to and supply and mobilization of administrative units organized within the department.

## 16. OFFICERS FOR REGIMENTS AND SMALLER UNITS.

No officers for this reserve of higher grade than captain need be appointed or assigned until the numerical strength of the reserve of any branch of the service residing within a definite area is sufficient to warrant organization of units larger than companies, troops, batteries, etc.

The supply of officers for the reserve is the subject of another brochure.

An excellent source of supply of company officers during the early stages of this organization will be found among retired noncommissioned officers and ex-noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army living now at various places throughout the country. These should all be given opportunity to compete by examination for appointment to the grades of company officers. Field officers for the reserve should be selected after examination from among retired officers and ex-officers of the Regular Army living within the proper departments of administrative unit areas.



## 17. OFFICERS FOR DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES.

Divisions and brigades when organized should be commanded by officers of the Regular Army, detailed in peace for such duty, appointments as general officers becoming effective only on mobilization because of actual or threatened hostilities.

Such appointments should create temporary vacancies in the grades held by such appointees, to be filled in a manner provided for similar temporary vacancies caused by appointments to higher volunteer rank under section 8 of the act approved April 25, 1914.

## 18. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

Deposits of arms and equipment for this reserve should be placed in storage at Army posts, in Government buildings, and at rifle ranges of the Organized Militia. Where such facilities are not available, at storehouses erected for the purpose.

At each such location an officer of the reserve, placed on active duty throughout the year, should be custodian of and accountable for the arms and equipment.

Sites for these deposits, as they are to become mobilization points for the reserve, should be places from which railway communication facilitates prompt dispatch of mobilized units toward camps of concentration or mobilization.

## 19. ANNUAL TRAINING OF RESERVE.

While every enlisted member of the reserve will have had training sufficient to establish his efficiency before furlough to the reserve, maintenance of that degree of efficiency and demonstration that he is still physically and morally fit for service suggest the propriety of an annual period of inspection and training.

In the report of the Organization of the Land Forces, 1912, the period recommended for such training was 10 days each year.

Without this opportunity to determine the physical and moral state of each reservist and his dependability as a possible soldier in war, the country may find, when actual or threatened hostilities cause mobilization of the reserve, that its personnel is not dependable to the extent shown by records of its strength.

## 20. ELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT.

Until mobilization places or camps can be designated for assembly of units as large as regiments, the reserve should have its training at the nearest Army stations. Until units as large as companies, troops, and batteries are organized, individual reservists joining at the nearest Army stations should be attached to regular organizations

of the arm of service appropriate. During the assembly for training each reservist should be physically examined and his conduct and habits observed closely. If he should have developed disease such as to render him probably unfit for service in war, or if his character be such as to render him undesirable as a soldier, he should be discharged. Having been examined physically at the time of furlough to the reserve, no right to pension for disability incurred during such status of furlough should be recognized.

For failure to comply with orders to report for training, a reservist can be tried and punished, if arrested. Whether such disciplinary action should be undertaken or the delinquent discharged for the convenience of the Government is a question that can be best determined after experience with a reserve system. The controlling policy should be to count upon no strength of the reserve that is not dependable in case of war.

## 21. SHOULD PAY BE GIVEN FOR SERVICE IN RESERVE?

A wise means of insuring presence of reservists at the annual training is to postpone the delivery to him of any payment authorized until he has appeared at the designated assembly point and completed the training prescribed. This leads to the question of remuneration for service while on furlough as a member of the reserve.

Under a system of compulsory service no pay is necessary or wise. The furloughed soldier is a citizen and his annual training is a compliance with the law which specifies the duties demanded of him in return for rights and privileges enjoyed.

Under a system of voluntary enlistment, some pay, monthly or annual, may be necessary, or citizens will not enlist in sufficient numbers to enable the troops with the colors to develop sufficient reserves. Whatever be the amount found necessary and desirable, payment thereof is for having been ready and dependable as a reservist for the time for which payment is to be made. To pay by mail on mere report by the reservist that he is alive and residing at his proper address is to pay possibly for one who would not be acceptable as a soldier if called to the colors.

## 22. PAY DUE FOR ANNUAL TRAINING.

Full pay of grade held on furlough, for the period spent in training, and traveling allowances to place of assembly and return to his home should be paid whether any reserve pay be authorized or not.

Men furloughed as noncommissioned officers should hold such grades during training, subject to reduction if their conduct or lack of efficiency warrant.

When the training is to be had at a point distant from the assembly point or deposit of arms and equipment, transportation should be by organization.

Transportation from homes to the assembly points should be issued by the reserve officers on active duty at assembly point, or by any postmaster to whom transportation requests can be issued as an acting quartermaster. Subsistence for individuals should be provided by reimbursement at reasonable rate per meal instead of by advance of funds.

### 23. ADVANTAGES OF ANNUAL ASSEMBLY RESERVE.

The character of training deemed necessary will be demonstrated only by experience.

The main purposes of assembly for training will be:

(1) Opportunity of reserve officers to acquire some knowledge of their subordinates;

(2) Opportunity to eliminate the undesirable and promote the efficient;

(3) Opportunity to insure continued acquaintance of men with arms and equipment, the models of which may have changed during their furloughs;

(4) Opportunity through joint maneuvers with the troops with the colors to preserve acquaintance with modern and possibly changing methods of tactical training; and

(5) Opportunity to verify the number and inspect the condition of men shown by the returns to belong to the reserve.

Any one of these purposes should prove sufficient warrant for the expense incurred through such periodical opportunity to make an inventory of our reserve and determine its value as a military asset.

### 24. MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE.

The mobilization of a reserve should be subject to orders of the President. Solution of our military problem demands that the reserve be as ready for prompt action as troops with the colors. It will not be as near the scene of its intended action, but no delay in calling its members to the colors should result through necessity, as under the present law, of waiting for authority of Congress.

Having been directed by the President, mobilization should proceed under control by department commanders.

Units having assembled at the points previously designated and used for deposit of arms and equipment for each annual training should be moved by department commanders, according to instructions received by them, either to designated points in the theater of

operations or to mobilization or concentration camps. Whether organizations should be held in the areas pertaining thereto for delivery of animals and motor or wagon transportation or should be sent to camps of mobilization and there supplied with transportation of this kind will depend upon the military situation. Usually the latter course will be preferable, as wagons, harness, etc., from general supply depots and animals purchased or requisitioned may be more economically and promptly delivered to organizations at camps of mobilization.

## 25. NOTICE OF MOBILIZATION.

Notice of orders for mobilization, however received, should charge each officer and man of the reserve with the duty of reporting at the place where arms and equipment are deposited for his organization. A proper way of serving such notice would be by posting a copy of the proclamation of the President at every post office, railroad station, and telegraph office in the country. This duty could be assigned to postmasters. In addition, written notice should be mailed by the reserve officers on active duty at all the assembly points at which arms and equipment are deposited to each member of the organization required to assemble at such points. These, in blank forms, should be addressed in time of peace, only the date of mobilization being entered before mailing. Addresses should be changed as residences change.

## 26. TRANSPORTATION AND SUBSISTENCE OF RESERVISTS.

Postmasters, designated as acting quartermasters, should be given blank transportation requests with which to furnish reservists transportation to places of assembly. After the reserve has been developed to the strength above shown possible, places of assembly will be so numerous and well distributed that, except in the case of members of Signal Corps, engineers, and possibly certain field artillery organizations, no reservist need travel more than a few hours in order to join. Reimbursement for expense of meals en route, at a rate of 25 cents per meal, should be made after reporting at the assembly point. Officers joining, on mobilization, should receive mileage from homes to places designated for commencement of their duties.

## 27. RECORD OF ASSEMBLY AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION.

No muster will be necessary. Organization rolls should be kept up to date in peace so that notation on such rolls of the date each reservist joins need be the only official record of the date when his service under mobilization is commenced. Physical examination by a surgeon of the reserve should be made as soon as practicable after



joining to determine whether his condition warrants service either (1) with his organization or (2) in some less active status with the line of communications troops or at a regimental depot. In some cases physical disability for any use in war may warrant discharge. No soldier should be forwarded with his organization who is not physically fit for service in the field and free from communicable disease.

## 28. CLOTHING FOR RESERVISTS.

Whether each member of the reserve be required to keep himself supplied in peace with one serviceable service uniform, to be worn to place of assembly on mobilization, or the clothing for each organization be deposited with arms and equipment and issued for each training period and on mobilization, can be determined only by experience. As a soldier's title to his clothing is shared by the Government until discharge, it is legal and equitable to require him to keep some service uniform during his period of furlough and to use it at each annual assembly for training and on mobilization.

On the other hand, a furloughed soldier might wear this uniform when not called for training or mobilization, and many would not have serviceable clothing when such is needed.

An organization will be more uniformly and serviceably clothed if the latter plan be finally adopted, but its adoption will increase considerably the expense of maintaining the reserve.

## 29. ADVANTAGES OF POLICY OUTLINED.

The policy recommended will develop a reserve. Its strength can be definitely estimated. Its efficient employment with the regular troops with the colors whenever circumstances warrant mobilization can be reasonably anticipated. Its adoption will reduce the per capita cost of the force demanded for solution of the national military problem.

While more than human foresight is required to frame legislation for which subsequent experience may not suggest the propriety of amendment, the reasons just cited justify adoption of legislation giving sanction to the policy.

